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Abstract
In recent years, ride-hailing services (RHSs) have be-
come increasingly popular, serving millions of users per
day. Such systems, however, raise significant privacy
concerns, because service providers are able to track the
precise mobility patterns of all riders and drivers. In this
paper, we propose ORide (Oblivious Ride), a privacy-
preserving RHS based on somewhat-homomorphic en-
cryption with optimizations such as ciphertext packing
and transformed processing. With ORide, a service
provider can match riders and drivers without learning
their identities or location information. ORide offers rid-
ers with fairly large anonymity sets (e.g., several thou-
sands), even in sparsely populated areas. In addition,
ORide supports key RHS features such as easy payment,
reputation scores, accountability, and retrieval of lost
items. Using real data-sets that consist of millions of
rides, we show that the computational and network over-
head introduced by ORide is acceptable. For example,
ORide adds only several milliseconds to ride-hailing op-
erations, and the extra driving distance for a driver is less
than 0.5 km in more than 75% of the cases evaluated. In
short, we show that a RHS can offer strong privacy guar-
antees to both riders and drivers while maintaining the
convenience of its services.
1 Introduction
Ride-hailing services (RHSs), such as Uber and Lyft, en-
able millions of riders and drivers worldwide to set up
rides via their smartphones. Their advantage over tra-
ditional taxi services is due to the convenience of their
services, e.g., ride requests at the touch of a button,
fare estimation, automatic payments, and reputation rat-
ings. Moreover, the accountability provided by RHSs
is a key feature for riders and drivers, as it make them
feel safer [10, 14]. For instance, in case of a criminal in-
vestigation, the RHS provider can offer law-enforcement
agencies with the location trace of a particular ride and
the identities of the participants.
To offer such services, however, RHSs collect a vast
amount of sensitive information that puts at risk the pri-
vacy of riders and drivers. First, for each ride, the loca-
tion traces and rider’s and driver’s identities are known
to the service provider (SP). As a result, the SP, or
any entity with access to this data, can infer sensitive
information about riders’ activities (such as one-night
stands [34]), monitor the locations of riders in real-time
for entertainment [17], track the whereabouts of their ex-
lovers [40], look up trip information of celebrities [24],
and even mount revenge attacks against journalists criti-
cal of such services [44]. In the case of drivers, there are
reports of SPs that track drivers to find if the drivers at-
tended protests [1]. Second, due to the release of drivers’
personal identifiable information (PII) early in the ride
set-up procedure, an outsider adversary can massively
collect drivers’ PII [37]. Third, there is evidence that
RHS drivers and riders are discriminated based on the
racial and/or gender information specified in their pro-
files [19]. Hence, there is a strong need to provide pri-
vacy and anonymity for both riders and drivers w.r.t. the
SP and each other.
To the best of our knowledge, the only privacy-
friendly alternative to current RHSs is PrivateRide, re-
cently proposed by us [37]. However, this work has some
limitations, i.e., it does not provide strong privacy guar-
antees for riders, and offers less accountability and us-
ability, compared to the current RHSs (see Section 2).
Therefore, a mechanism with more robust privacy and
accountability guarantees is needed.
We present ORide, a privacy-preserving RHS in-
spired by PrivateRide; it reuses only one operation from
PrivateRide, i.e., the proximity check to prevent drivers’
PII from being harvested (see Section 5.4). ORide en-
ables the SP to efficiently match riders and drivers with-
out leaking either their identities or their locations, while
providing accountability to deter misbehavior. ORide
provides strong privacy for both riders and drivers,
i.e., all users in the system are part of large anonymity
sets, even if they are in sparsely populated areas. Even
in the extreme case of targeted attacks (i.e., a strong cu-
rious SP wants to know the destination of a specific rider
given the time and location of her pick-up event [32]), the
location privacy of the rider’s destination is still guaran-
teed. For this purpose, ORide relies on state-of-the-art
somewhat-homomorphic encryption system [15] (SHE),
to which we apply optimizations for ciphertext packing
and transformed processing [36], hence enabling a no-
table boost in performance and a reduction in overhead
w.r.t. naive cryptographic solutions.
Accountability and usability are often considered as
important as privacy in RHSs [10, 14]; this introduces
challenges in resolving the uneasy tension between pri-
vacy, accountability and usability. To achieve account-
able privacy, ORide enables the SP to revoke, when
needed, the anonymity of misbehaving riders or drivers.
However, the SP does not have full control over this re-
identification operation, i.e., it is able to do it only with
the support from the affected party. In addition, to pre-
serve the convenience of the service, ORide supports au-
tomatic payment through credit cards and enables riders
to contact drivers for lost items. ORide also preserves the
reputation-rating operations of current RHSs.
The evaluation of ORide by using real data-sets from
NYC taxi cabs [42] shows that, even with strong bit-
security of more than 112 bits, ORide introduces ac-
ceptable computational and bandwidth costs for riders,
drivers and the SP. For example, for each ride request,
a rider needs to download only one ciphertext of size
186 KB with a computational overhead of less than ten
milliseconds. ORide also provides large anonymity sets
for riders at the cost of acceptable bandwidth require-
ments for the drivers: e.g., for rides in the boroughs of
Queens and Bronx, a ride would have an anonymity set
of about 26,000, and the drivers are only required to have
a data-connection speed of less than 2 Mbps. Moreover,
our results show that ORide is scalable, as we considered
a request load that is significantly higher than the one in
current RHSs, e.g., Uber accounts for only 15% of the
ride pick-up requests in NYC [41].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• A novel, oblivious, and efficient matching mechanism.
ORide includes a novel protocol based on quantum-
resistant SHE to match riders and drivers, without re-
vealing their identities and locations to the SP. We op-
timize our SHE-based protocol to considerably reduce
the bandwidth requirements and the processing over-
head, compared to a vanilla SHE-based protocol; and
we propose an efficient extension to deal with malicious
drivers.
• The design and prototype of ORide. ORide supports the
matching of riders and drivers, different accountability
mechanisms, and it reduces the amount of sensitive in-
formation revealed to the SP. In particular, ORide sup-
ports functionalities that are often considered also as
important as privacy, such as credit-card payment, repu-
tation rating, contacting drivers in case of lost items and
traceability in case of criminal activity during a ride.
• Thorough performance evaluation. Using real data-sets
and robust security parameters (i.e., 112 bits security),
we show that ORide provides strong privacy guarantees
for riders and drivers. In addition, the computational
and network overhead introduced by ORide is practical
for riders, drivers and SP. We also show that ORide has
a negligible effect on the accuracy of matching riders
and drivers compared with current RHSs.
2 Related Work
Researchers have proposed different privacy-enhancing
solutions for ride sharing (i.e., car pooling) services [5,
13, 20, 21, 38] and public transportation ticketing sys-
tems [7, 25, 30]. However, little work exists in the area
of privacy and security for RHSs, probably due to their
relative novelty. According to our literature review, the
most relevant work in this area is PrivateRide [37].
PrivateRide is the first system to enhance location pri-
vacy for riders and protect drivers’ information from har-
vesting attacks while maintaining the convenience of the
service. However, it has several limitations that are ad-
dressed in this work. First, PrivateRide cannot guaran-
tee the same level of privacy to all riders, because the
size of the anonymity set in a particular cloaked area
depends on the density of riders in that area. For in-
stance, the anonymity set is smaller for ride requests
in areas outside a city center. Also, the tradeoff be-
tween the size of a cloaked area and the accuracy of the
ride-matching results prevents the use of larger cloaking
areas (i.e., to achieve larger anonymity sets). Second,
PrivateRide does not protect drivers’s privacy, also im-
portant [1]. Third, PrivateRide provides limited account-
ability features to deal with relatively common scenar-
ios such as drivers and riders physically attacking each
other (i.e., safety concerns) or items being lost during
a ride; for many users, such features can be as impor-
tant as their privacy. Fourth, PrivateRide’s usability is
reduced w.r.t. current RHSs because the supported pay-
ment mechanism is less convenient (i.e., PrivateRide re-
quires payments with e-cash bought in advance before a
ride). Moreover, ride-matching is suboptimal, because
the distance between rider and drivers is estimated using
the centers of the cloaked areas, instead of exact loca-
tions, resulting in additional waiting time for riders.
3 System Model
Our goal is to design a RHS that provides stronger pri-
vacy guarantees to both riders and drivers, as well as bet-
ter or equivalent usability and accountability compared
with PrivateRide [37] and current RHSs (e.g., Uber, Lyft,
and Easy Taxi). To do so, we assume a system consisting
of three parties: riders, drivers and the service provider
(SP). We now describe our adversarial and system as-
sumptions.
3.1 Adversarial Assumptions
In our model, riders and drivers are active adversaries.
The SP is a passive adversary (i.e., honest-but-curious).
We assume that most riders and drivers do not collude
with the SP, as drivers are independent contractors rather
than SP’s employees. The case of a covertly active SP
is discussed in Section 7.2. In such a case, we assume
that the SP does not provide riders and drivers with ma-
licious apps. This is a reasonable assumption, because
such attacks can be detected by third-parties via reverse-
engineering or black-box analyses; the risk of public ex-
posure and reputation loss is a strong deterrent against
such attacks.
Given that they were observed in current RHSs
(i.e., higher chance of occurring), we focus on the fol-
lowing attacks:
• (A1) The riders and drivers might attempt to assault
each other [46]; in extreme cases, a driver might at-
tempt to kidnap and/or kill the rider, or vice versa
[35, 47].
• (A2) The SP uses its knowledge about side informa-
tion about riders and drivers, including their home/work
addresses, together with protocol transcripts, to per-
form large-scale inference attacks to profile riders’ and
drivers’ activities [34].
• (A3) The SP might attempt to carry out targeted attacks
on specific riders. That is, besides their home/work ad-
dresses, the SP knows the precise pick-up location and
time of a specific rider and wants to know the drop-off
location and time of this ride, or vice versa [24, 32,44].
3.2 Design Goals
The goal of ORide is to defend against the attacks listed
in Section 3.1, and to offer the same level of accountabil-
ity and usability as current RHSs, as follows.
• Riders and drivers are held accountable for their behav-
iors during their rides, i.e., the SP is able to identify
misbehaving riders or drivers when needed, e.g., if one
party attacks the other. However, the SP is able to iden-
tify the misbehaving party only with support from the
affected party (or her trusted contacts, see Section 6.)
• The system preserves the convenience and usability
properties offered by current RHSs, such as payment
Notation Description
ks Ephemeral private key
k p Ephemeral public key
certX Public-key certificate of X
locX Planar coordinates of X , locX = (xX ,yX )
n Number of available drivers
d Degree of the polynomial
dt Deposit token
rdt A random number to create a deposit token
z A geographical zone
sigX{m} Message m and signature of X on m
BsigSP(m) Blind signature of the SP on message m
Table 1: Table of notations
through credit cards and reputation rating. In addition,
once a rider is matched with a driver, she can track the
location of the driver approaching the pick-up location,
and they can contact each other to coordinate the pick-
up. The system also enables riders to contact drivers of
their past rides to find lost items.
3.3 System Assumptions
We assume that the metadata of the network and lower
communication layers cannot be used to identify riders
and drivers or to link their activities. Such an assumption
is reasonable because, in most cases, the smartphones of
drivers and riders do not have fixed public IP addresses;
they access the Internet via a NAT gateway offered by
their cellular provider. If needed, a VPN proxy or Tor
could be used to hide network identifiers.
In addition, we assume that, besides localization ca-
pabilities, the rider’s and driver’s smartphones support
peer-to-peer wireless communication, e.g., Bluetooth
and WiFi Direct. Also, for all location-based compu-
tations, the apps use a coordinate system such that the
Euclidean distances correspond to the great-circle dis-
tances, e.g., by using map-projection systems for local
areas such as UTM [45] to convert a pair of (latitude,
longitude) to planar coordinates (x, y). Moreover, drivers
use a navigation app that does not leak their locations to
the SP. This can be done by using a third-party naviga-
tion/traffic app (e.g., Google Maps, TomTom, Garmin)
or pre-fetching the map of their operating areas (e.g., a
city) and using the navigation app in off-line mode.
3.4 Notation
Throughout the rest of this work, we denote polynomials
and scalar values with lowercase letters, variables and
rings with uppercase letters, and vectors with boldface
letters. b.e denotes rounding to the nearest integer. A
polynomial of degree (d−1) will be interchangeably de-
noted as a = ∑d−1i=0 aiX
i or in its vector form a when there
is no ambiguity. The used symbols and terms are sum-
marized in Table 1.
4 Oblivious Ride-Matching Protocol
One of the challenges in privacy-preserving RHSs is how
to efficiently match ride requests to ride offers with-
out revealing the riders’ and drivers’ locations to each
other and to the SP. For this, ORide relies on somewhat-
homomorphic encryption (see Section 4.1) where the rid-
ers and drivers send their encrypted locations to the SP,
from which the SP computes the encrypted squared Eu-
clidean distances between them. We detail this in the
following sections. For details about other cryptographic
primitives used in ORide, see Appendix A.3.
4.1 Somewhat-Homomorphic Encryption
Somewhat-Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) is a special
kind of malleable encryption that allows a certain num-
ber of operations (additions and multiplications) over ci-
phertexts, without the need to decrypt them first. All
SHE cryptosystems present semantic security, i.e., it is
not (computationally) possible to know if two different
encryptions conceal the same plaintext. Therefore, it is
possible for a party without the private key (in our case,
the SP), to operate on the ciphertexts produced by riders
and drivers, without obtaining any information about the
plaintext values. Additionally, we choose one of the most
recent and efficient SHE schemes based on ideal lattices,
the FV scheme [15]. This scheme relies on the hardness
of the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem [28].
Note that whenever working with cryptosystems based
on finite rings, we usually work with integer numbers,
hence, from here on, we will assume that all inputs are
adequately quantized as integers. Here, we briefly de-
scribe the main functions of the FV scheme.
For plaintext elements in a polynomial quotient ring
m ∈ Rt = Zt [X ]/(Xd + 1) and ciphertext elements in
Rq = Zq[X ]/(Xd +1), where q and t are positive integers
q> t defining the upperbound of the ciphertext and plain-
text coefficients, respectively. Let ∆ = bq/tc and χk,χn
be two short noise random distributions in Rq, the FV en-
cryption of a message m ∈ Rt with secret key ks = s∼ χk
and public key k p = [p0, p1] = [(−a · s+e),a] ∈ R2q, with
e drawn from χn and a randomly chosen in Rq, generated
by FV.GenKeys, results in a vector expressed as
c = FV.Enc(k p,m)= [p0 ·u+e1+∆ ·m, p1 ·u+e2], (1)
where u is drawn from χk, and e1,e2 are short random
polynomials from the error distribution χn. All opera-
tions are in Rq.
Decryption of a ciphertext c = [c0,c1] works as
m = FV.Dec(ks,c) = (bt · [c0 + c1 · s mod q]/qe) mod t.
The scheme enables us to seamlessly add (FV.Add),
subtract (FV.Sub) and multiply (FV.Mul) two encryp-
tions to obtain the encryption of the added, subtracted,
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Figure 1: Our optimized ride-matching approach enables
the SP to send to the rider a single ciphertext containing all
the squared distances (dist2Di ) between the rider and avail-
able drivers as opposed to one ciphertext per driver (naive ap-
proach).
and multiplied plaintexts respectively; multiplications
consider the encryptions as polynomials in v: [c0,c1]→
co +c1 ·v, such that the product between c and c′ is eval-
uated as: [c0,c1] · [c′0,c′1]→ c0 · c′0 +(c0 · c′1 + c1 · c′0)v+
c1 · c′1 · v2 → [c′′0 ,c′′1 ,c′′2 ], which results in a ciphertext in
R3q, with one extra polynomial. It is possible to recover a
fresh-like encryption with two polynomials by employ-
ing a relinearization primitive, which requires the usage
of a matrix (relinearization key) composed of encrypted
pieces of the secret key (we refer the reader to [15] for
further details).
4.2 Naive Approach
SHE can be applied to the ride-matching problem in
RHSs as follows. When a rider wants to make a ride
request, she generates an ephemeral FV public/private
key-pair together with a relinearization key. She uses the
public key to encrypt her planar coordinates and obtains
their encrypted forms. She then informs the SP about the
zone of her pick-up location, the public and relineariza-
tion keys and her encrypted planar coordinates. When
this information arrives at the SP, the SP broadcasts the
public key to all drivers available in that zone. Each
driver uses the public key to encrypt their planar coordi-
nates and sends them to the SP. The SP computes, based
on their encrypted coordinates, the encrypted distances
between the rider and the drivers, and it returns the en-
crypted distances to the rider, from which the rider can
decrypt and select the best match, e.g., the driver who is
the closest to her pick-up location.
However, due to the high ciphertext expansion, a naive
use of SHE would incur impractical computational and
bandwidth costs for the riders and the SP. Furthermore,
for each ride request, the SP would need to separately
compute the encrypted distances between the rider and
each of the drivers: For n drivers, this would mean n
distance calculations between encrypted polynomials of
d coefficients each, and n ciphertext distances returned
to the rider. This would incur an unfeasible overhead
in terms of computations for the SP, consequently de-
laying the ride-matching for the rider and a considerable
bandwidth overhead at the rider-SP link, e.g., hundreds
of MBs if the system has several thousand drivers (see
Section 9.3).
4.3 Optimized Approach
We propose two optimizations: ciphertext packing and
transform processing, to enable the SP to operate on d
elements of Zt packed as a polynomial in Rt in a single
ciphertext, such that each encrypted operation affects all
the coefficients in parallel (see Fig. 1). When the rider
decrypts this ciphertext, she can recover these d values
by looking at all the coefficients. From here on, we as-
sume that d ≥ n, which will usually be the case due to
the security bounds on d (see Section 8); in other cases,
dn/de encryptions can be used to pack the whole set of
distances analogously.
First, ciphertext packing enables the SP to pack n ci-
phertext distances into one ciphertext, hence reducing
the bandwidth overhead, but this is not enough for
our goal. As we show in Section 5.4, we use all the
n packed encrypted planar coordinates from the drivers
independently of each other to calculate all the dis-
tances homomorphically in the same encrypted opera-
tion, so we need coefficient-wise homomorphic opera-
tions. While polynomial additions and subtractions are
naturally coefficient-wise, polynomial multiplication in
Rt (and its homomorphic counterpart in Rq) is a convolu-
tion product of the coefficients. A well-known method
for transforming convolution products into coefficient-
wise products (and vice-versa) in polynomial rings is
the Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) [36], a Fourier
transform specialized for finite fields. This transform
is commonly used in the ciphertext space to speed up
polynomial multiplications that are then implemented as
coefficient-wise products. More details about NTT can
be found in Appendix A.3.
In our case, for the second optimization, in order
that products in the encrypted domain be translated into
coefficient-wise products in the plaintext domain, we ap-
ply an inverse-NTT to plaintexts before encryption and
an NTT after decryption. The NTT does not affect addi-
tions and subtractions because it is linear. We note that
the NTT exists only for certain values of d and t, in par-
ticular when t is a prime and d divides t − 1. To make
operations in Zt simulate operations in N on our values,
we choose d = 2l as a power of two and t as a suffi-
ciently large Proth prime (of the form k2l + 1, see [36])
such that all squared-Euclidean distances are less than t.
As a result, we improve on both the bandwidth and the
computation overhead.
Moreover, due to the low degree of the evaluated op-
erations (squared Euclidean distances), we avoid the use
of re-linearizations at the SP, which (a) reduces the need
to generate and to send the relinearization key from the
rider to the SP, (b) reduces the noise inside the encryp-
tions, and (c) enables more efficient operations at the SP,
at the cost of one extra polynomial to represent the en-
crypted distance returned to the rider.
5 ORide
In this section, we present our ORide protocols. We be-
gin with an overview of the system and then detail ORide
operations.
5.1 ORide Overview
ORide provides strong location privacy and anonymity
for riders and drivers while still guaranteeing service ac-
countability, secure payment and reputation rating op-
erations. For this purpose, the riders and the drivers
must possess ride prerequisites (Section 5.2), including
anonymous credentials (ACs), deposit tokens, and digi-
tal certificates issued by the SP. To participate in the sys-
tem, both riders and drivers create anonymous sessions
by logging in to the service (Section 5.3) with their re-
spective ACs. Drivers periodically report to the SP the
geographical zones where they are located. These zones
are defined by the SP to balance the network load in the
system and the size of the anonymity set of the zones
(Section 9.4). Note that, in contrast to PrivateRide, ex-
panding the size of a zone in ORide does not affect the
performance of the ride-matching and fare-calculation
operations (Section 5.4).
When a rider initiates a ride request, the SP, the rider
and drivers are involved in a ride set-up procedure (Sec-
tion 5.4) that matches the rider to a driver. In addition,
as in current RHSs, the rider and the driver agree on the
fare based on the estimated distance and duration of the
ride [33, 39]. Once the rider and the driver are matched
together, they terminate their anonymous sessions. When
the ride is completed, the driver creates a new anony-
mous session and notifies the SP that she is available
again. Note that drop-off times and locations are not
reported to the SP. Moreover, some time after the ride
finishes, i.e., at the end of the day, the rider and driver
perform ride-payment and reputation-rating operations
(Section 5.5).
5.2 Ride Prerequisites
Digital certificates. We assume each rider and driver
has a digital certificate denoted as certR or certD, issued
by the SP at registration time. Each certificate contains a
public key and a randomly generated ID. The SP can use
this random ID to find the real identity of the certificate
holder. Note that the digital certificates are not used by
the riders and drivers to log in to the service, and they are
not revealed to the SP during a ride. They are used by the
riders and drivers to identify each other during the ride as
part of ORide’s accountability mechanism (Section 6).
Anonymous credentials. ORide relies on Anonymous
Credentials Light (ACL) [8], a linkable anonymous cre-
dential system, i.e., a user should use an AC only once
to avoid her transactions from being linkable. To use the
service anonymously, each user (rider or driver) requests
ACs in advance from the SP, using their digital certifi-
cate. Hereafter, we denote the anonymous credential for
a user X as ACX , where X is R for riders or D for drivers.
Each ACX contains the average reputation score repX , an
expiration date expX , and the secret key skX associated
with the public key pubX in the digital certificate of the
AC holder. To differentiate between riders and drivers
in the system, an AC also contains a role attribute roleX ,
i.e., roleX = 1 if X = D, and roleX = 0 if X = R.
Note that to prevent the SP from de-anonymizing
users by correlating the time an AC is issued with the
time it is used, or by relying on the AC’s expiration date,
the user’s app could automatically request ACs from the
SP at a certain time (e.g., at midnight), and the expira-
tion date is coarse-grained, e.g., all ACs issued in a day
expire at the end of that day. The reputation scores can-
not be used by the SP to de-anonymize the users, as they
are never shown to the SP during the rides. Furthermore,
to prevent users from abusing the system, the SP defines
a threshold on the number of ACs a rider or driver can
acquire per day.
Deposit token. Each rider is required to possess a de-
posit token and give it to the SP at the beginning of a
ride. In case of misbehavior, the token is not returned to
the rider. A deposit token, denoted as dt, is worth a fixed
amount of money defined by the SP. It is a random num-
ber generated by the rider, blindly signed by the SP (by
using blind-signature schemes e.g., [12]) such that the
SP is not able to link a token it issued and a token spent
by a rider. A rider deposits a token to the SP in the begin-
ning of the ride, and she is issued a new token by the SP
after the ride payment is successfully completed. Note
that the driver is not required to make a deposit because,
during the ride set-up operation, the rider and driver ex-
change their digital certificates with each other. Conse-
quently, if the driver misbehaves, the SP can identify the
driver by collaborating with the rider. We discuss this in
more detail in Section 5.6.
5.3 Log in to the Service
To use the service, the rider and the driver need to create
anonymous sessions to the SP: to do so, they use their
anonymous credentials ACR and ACD, respectively.
Rider. The rider sends to the SP the rider-role roleR and
the expiry date expR stated in her ACR. In addition, she
proves to the SP that the claimed values are correct and
that, in a zero-knowledge fashion, she knows the secret
key skR tied to the ACR.
Driver. Similarly to the rider, by using her ACD, the
driver follows the same aforementioned procedure to
anonymously log in to the service.
The SP assigns a one-time session ID to each anony-
mous session, to keep track of that session for coordina-
tion. For the sake of simple exposition, hereafter, we ex-
clude this one-time session ID from messages exchanged
between the rider/driver and the SP.
5.4 Ride Set-up
When a rider requests a ride, the operations performed
by the rider, the drivers and the SP are as follows (see
Fig. 2).
1. The rider generates an ephemeral FV public/private
key pair, denoted as (k p,ks). She first computes the
polynomial representations of the coordinates pxR =
∑
d−1
i=0 xRX
i and pyR = ∑
d−1
i=0 yRX
i. She then applies the
inverse-NTT on the polynomials and uses k p to encrypt
these values: cxR = FV.Enc(k p,NTT
−1(pxR)) and sim-
ilarly for cyR . She then sends the zone of her pick-up
location (denoted as z), deposit token dt, k p, cxR and
cyR to the SP.
2. The SP checks the validity of the deposit token, i.e., it
has not been used before. If the token is valid, the SP
adds it to the list of used tokens. It then sends to each
driver in zone z a different randomly permuted index
0≤ i < n and the public key k p.
3. The i-th driver encodes her coordinates in the i-th
coefficient: qixD = xDiX
i and qiyD = yDiX
i. Simi-
larly to the rider, she applies the inverse-NTT, en-
crypts these values and sends them to the SP: cixD =
FV.Enc(k p,NTT−1(qixD)) and analogously for c
i
yD .
4. The SP sums all drivers’ ciphertexts by using the ho-
momorphic property of the cryptosystem to pack them
together: cxD = ∑
n−1
i=0 c
i
xD and similarly for cyD . It then
homomorphically computes the n packed squared val-
ues of the Euclidean distances between the n drivers
and the rider in parallel, due to the packing cdist =
(cxR − cxD)2 + (cyR − cyD)2, and it sends the result to
the rider (see Fig. 1).
5. The rider decrypts the ciphertext and applies the NTT
to obtain a squared distance in each coefficient: dist =
NTT(FV.Dec(ks,cdist)). Then, she selects the driver
with the smallest squared distance.
6. The SP notifies the selected driver. If she declines the
offer, the SP asks the rider to select a different driver;
it repeats this operation, until one driver accepts. The
Rider: anonymous session sR SP Driver: anonymous session sD
Generate (k p,ks)
pxR = ∑
d−1
i=0 xRX
i
pyR = ∑
d−1
i=0 yRX
i
cxR = FV.Enc(k p,NTT
−1(pxR ))
cyR = FV.Enc(k p,NTT
−1(pyR ))
qixD = xDi X
i
qiyD = yDi X
i
cixD = FV.Enc(k p,NTT
−1(qixD ))
ciyD = FV.Enc(k p,NTT
−1(qiyD ))
cxD = ∑
n−1
i=0 c
i
xD
cyD = ∑
n−1
i=0 c
i
yD
cdist = (cxR − cxD )2 +(cyR − cyD )2
dist = NTT(FV.Dec(ks,cdist))
Select driver, denoted ibest
(1) z, dt, cxR , cyR , k p (2) k p, i
(3) cixD , c
i
yD
(4) cdist
(5) ibest (6) Notify the selected driver
(7a) Secure channel (via SP): exchange repR and repD
(7b) Secure channel (via SP): exchange certR, certD,precise locations
(8) Proximity check and validation of secure channel
(9) Driver’s identifying info: plate number, profile picture
(10) Fare report: sigR−D{day, fare, certR, certD}
Figure 2: ORide ride setup protocol. The dashed arrows represent the secure channel (via the SP), and the dotted
arrows represent the proximity channel.
SP confirms with the rider and the driver that they have
been assigned to each other.
7a. The rider and the driver establish a secure channel via
the SP, e.g., using the unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman
protocol, to exchange data that should not be ob-
served by the SP.1 From the information used to de-
rive the secret key of the secure channel, the rider and
the driver compute a shared secret pairing PIN. This
pairing PIN will be used for the proximity-check oper-
ation in Step 8.
With this secure channel, the rider and the driver reveal
their reputation scores to each other. The trustworthi-
ness of the revealed values is proved by showing that
they are indeed the values in the rider’s and driver’s
ACs. If the rider’s reputation is too low, the driver
can abort the protocol at this step. Likewise, the rider
can select another driver, by using the list of cleartext
1Detection of man-in-the-middle attacks by the SP is done in
Step 8.
squared Euclidean distances she obtained in Step 5.
7b. Via the secure channel, the rider and the driver ex-
change their precise locations (i.e., locR and locD, re-
spectively). In addition, they exchange their digital cer-
tificates (i.e., certR and certD) with each other. This pro-
vides accountability for the rider and driver (see Sec-
tion 6).
The driver drives from her current location locD to the
pick-up location locR, using an off-line navigation app
or a third-party navigation app (such as Google Maps
or TomTom). She sends, in real time via the secure
channel, her precise locations to the rider, thus the rider
can track the movements of the car. Also, at this point,
the rider and the driver can call or message each other
through their ride-hailing apps, if needed. They can
also terminate their anonymous sessions with the SP.
8. When the rider and the driver are in proximity, the
driver performs a proximity check to verify the physical
presence of the rider before releasing her identifying in-
formation: they use a short-range wireless technology
(e.g., Bluetooth or WiFi Direct) to set up a proximity
channel using the pairing PIN. If the channel is suc-
cessfully established, the driver can verify that the rider
is in her proximity. This is similar to the approach pro-
posed in [37] to prevent drivers’ PII from being har-
vested. If this step fails, the driver can decide to abort
the protocol. Also, via the proximity channel, the rider
and the driver can check whether the secure channel
(established at Step 7a) was tampered with by the SP.
9. The driver releases her identifying information to the
rider, including her vehicle’s license plate number and
her profile picture. This information helps the rider to
identify the driver and her car and to prevent certain
threats, e.g., fake drivers [43]. Therefore, it is needed
when the rider is about to enter the car, i.e., the re-
quired communication distance between the phones of
the rider and the driver is small (e.g., several meters).
10. The rider and the driver create a fare report. A fare re-
port is a token generated by the rider and driver; and at
the end of the day, the driver deposits it to the SP to get
paid (Section 5.5). A fare report is created as follows.
The rider sends her drop-off location to the driver via
the secure channel, they agree on the path, and based
on the estimated path, they compute the fare. The rider
and driver then sign a message consisting of the day of
the ride, the fare and their certificates, i.e., fare report =
sigR−D{day, fare, certR, certD}, using the private keys
associated with their certR and certD. Note that this
upfront-fare method has been implemented in current
RHSs, such as in Uber [33] and in Lyft [39]. Once the
driver receives the fare report from the rider, the ride
begins. The rider’s and driver’s app do not report any
information to the SP at this stage and during the ride.
Also, to prevent the SP from inferring the starting time
of the ride based on the interactions between the rider
and the driver over the secure channel, the rider and
driver can randomly send dummy information to each
other through the secure channel.
Intuitively, because the distances between the rider
and drivers are computed based on their (encrypted) pre-
cise locations, expanding the size of the zone will not
result in negative effects on the performance of the ride-
matching and fare-calculation operations. In addition,
with ciphertext packing, we reduce by a factor of n the
communication between the SP and the rider. However,
if the drivers are malicious, they could corrupt the inputs
from other drivers. Furthermore, note that in Step 1 of
the protocol, any valid rider can generate an ephemeral
public/private key pair. Consequently, if the SP is an ac-
tive attacker, it could track the locations of the drivers,
thus indirectly track the locations of the riders. We dis-
cuss solutions to these potential issues in Section 7.
5.5 Ride Payment and Reputation Rating
When the car arrives at the drop-off location, the driver
creates a new anonymous session to the SP. This enables
her to receive ride-request broadcasts from the SP. Note
that the driver does not report to the SP that the ride is
completed.
The driver sends to the SP the fare report
sigR−D{day, fare, certR, certD} she received during the
ride set-up operation (step 10, Section 5.4). The SP
checks the correctness of the rider certificate certR in the
fare report and the correctness of the signature. If they
are valid, the SP charges the rider according to her pay-
ment method, e.g., credit card. It then subtracts the ser-
vice fee, and deposits the remainder to the driver. The SP
then notifies the rider about the payment. The rider gen-
erates a random number rdt , blinds it to r′dt , and sends
r′dt to the SP. The SP signs r
′
dt (i.e., dt
′ = sigSP{r′dt},
and it sends this blind signature to the rider’s account.
The rider unblinds the signature to obtain the deposit to-
ken which she can use for her next ride. Note that this
procedure can be done automatically by the rider’s app.
Once the payment is successfully completed, the rider
and driver can rate the reputation of each other, similarly
to current RHSs. They can log in to the service with their
real credentials and provide the reputation score for the
party whom they rode with.
Note that ORide preserves the payment and
reputation-rating operations of the current RHSs.
That is, unlike PrivateRide, it does not require the rider
to purchase e-cash in advance, and it does not require
the rider and the driver to generate and keep extra
cryptographic tokens for the reputation-rating operation.
Also, ORide does not require the rider and the driver
to hide their identifying information to the SP during
the payment and reputation-rating operations, because
both the rider and driver are anonymous during the ride.
However, it is important to note that, in order to prevent
the SP from de-anonymizing the rider and the driver by
correlating the time that a fare report is deposited with
the drop-off event of the ride, the payment operation
should not occur immediately after the ride, e.g., the
drivers deposit the fare reports to the SP at the end of
the day.
5.6 Ride Cancellation
As in current RHSs, a rider or a driver can cancel a ride
at any time before or during the ride. This, however, is
discouraged by the SP, because it can lead to malicious
behaviors: For example, once a rider and a driver are
assigned to each other by the SP, they meet at the pick-
up location and start the ride as normal; but, to avoid
the service fee, the rider or the driver can send a can-
cellation notification to the SP. Therefore, similarly to
current RHSs, if a rider or a driver cancels a ride a cer-
tain amount of time after the ride request, they should
be penalized by the SP, e.g., their reputation scores are
lowered or fees are charged [11].
In ORide, when a rider cancels a ride, the SP can of-
fer her two options: to lose her deposit token (i.e., pay
a penalty) or to reveal her certR and have her reputation
score lowered. If a driver cancels a ride, the SP can ask
the rider to reveal the certD, from which the SP can iden-
tify and penalize the driver according to its policy.
6 Accountability
In this section, we discuss the accountability goals (men-
tioned in Section 3.2) of ORide. This includes defense
mechanisms against the attack A1 in Section 3.1 and ad-
ditional features such as retrieval of lost items, assurance
of payment, and integrity of the reputation-rating opera-
tion. Attacks A2 and A3 are discussed in Section 8.
(A1) Accountability. ORide enables the rider and the
driver to exchange, during the ride set-up procedure,
their digital certificates, i.e., certR and certD, respec-
tively, and the fare report. This provides accountability
for riders and drivers, i.e., an affected party can report
to the SP the digital certificate of the attacker and the
fare report, from which the SP can identify the attack to
charge her a fee, lower her reputation and/or support le-
gal action. However, the SP is only able to identify the
attacker with support from the affected party. Likewise,
the affected party cannot obtain the real identity of the
attacker without support from the SP, because the certifi-
cates certR and certD contain only the pseudonyms and
only the SP knows the mapping between the pseudonyms
and the real identities of the certificate owners.
ORide enables the rider to share with her trusted peers
the driver’s certificate certD and the fare report, via out-
of-band channels such as messaging apps, or a plug-
in in her rider’s app. Similarly, during the ride, via
out-of-band channels, she can share her GPS trace with
her friends using (k, l) threshold secret sharing [16],
i.e., each GPS location point is split into l parts so that
any k out of l parts reconstruct the original coordinate.
Likewise, the driver can follow the same mechanism.
Such information can be shared with law enforcement
in case riders or drivers disappear (e.g., kidnapping), as
in current services. This is similar to the approach used
in personal safety apps, such as Google Trusted Con-
tacts [22].
Another risk in RHSs is assurance of payment. A rider
cannot avoid paying the fare of a ride, because the fare
report contains her digital certificate certR and the day of
the ride. As the rider and driver agree on the fare and both
sign it before the ride, they cannot subsequently increase
or decrease this fare. However, they might collude to un-
derpay the service fee to the SP, by agreeing on a small
fare and paying the difference in cash. Yet in this case,
ORide offers the same guarantees as current RHSs, be-
cause riders can already request a small ride through the
application and then pay in cash for a longer ride once
they have met the driver. In future work, we will explore
mechanisms to protect against such attacks.
Moreover, the bilateral rating system enables the SP to
ban abusive riders and drivers from the service. A rider
or driver cannot claim a better reputation for herself, be-
cause the proof for attributes in her AC will not be correct
w.r.t. her falsely claimed reputation. They also cannot ar-
bitrarily rate the reputation of each other, because a pay-
ment record is needed (the deposit of a fare report). In
addition, as discussed in Section 5.6, similarly to current
RHSs, ORide enables the SP to hold riders and drivers
accountable for ride cancellations.
SP incentives. From an economic perspective, ride-
hailing service SPs would have incentives to deploy
ORide because it provides privacy and security for the
riders and still preserves their business models (i.e., the
SP can still charge a commission for each ride). In or-
der to monetize ride data, the SPs can provide a discount
for riders if they reveal (part of) their GPS traces. In ad-
dition, privacy and security for RHSs could be required
by law and legislation, and ORide shows that it is tech-
nically possible to achieve a strong level of protection.
As such, this work lays the foundation for the design of
a privacy-preserving and secure RHSs.
Additional features. Similarly to current RHSs, ORide
enables the riders to retrieve lost items (i.e., items forgot-
ten in the car), as drivers’ certificates certD and car in-
formation are provided during the ride set-up procedure.
As discussed earlier, the riders can share certD with their
friends, hence even if the riders lose their phones, they
can still be able to retrieve the certD from their friends
and to then contact the driver (as in current RHSs). More-
over, due to the secure channel established between the
rider and the driver, the rider can still track the driver
trajectory while waiting at her pick-up location, or they
can contact each other (e.g., messaging or calling) when
needed.
7 Protecting against Malicious Behaviors
In this section, we describe how the protocol presented
in Section 5 can be extended to defend against malicious
drivers and a covertly active SP.
7.1 Malicious Drivers: Masking
As mentioned in Section 5.4, if a driver behaves mali-
ciously, she could encrypt non-zero values in the slots
other than her allotted one, thus corrupting the inputs
from other drivers. Our protocol can cope with this
malicious behavior by adding one extra step in which
the SP homomorphically multiplies each driver cipher-
text by a mask mi = NTT−1(X i) for the driver’s index i
(see notations from Section 5.4), which preserves only
the contents in the allocated slot. However, because the
mask does not hold any sensitive information and it is
known by the SP, a naive homomorphic multiplication
with an encrypted mask would incur an unjustified over-
head. Therefore, we propose, instead, a more efficient
multiplication operation, denoted ?, as follows.
Given a ciphertext c = [c0,c1] ∈ R2q corresponding to a
plaintext m∈ Rt , and a mask mi ∈ Rt , we want to obtain a
ciphertext c′ = c ?mi corresponding to the masked plain-
text FV.Dec(ks,c) ·mi. Here, mi can be thought of as
its own noiseless and unscaled encryption (Equation (1)
on page 4, evaluated for u,e1,e2 = 0, and no scale ∆),
being a vector in R2q with only one non-zero component
([mi,0] ∈ R2q). Therefore, the product results
c ?mi = [c0 ·mi,c1 ·mi].
The ? operation consists of two polynomial multipli-
cations, it avoids encryption of mi, halves the number
of products w.r.t. an encrypted homomorphic multipli-
cation, and keeps the cipher size from growing after the
product, thus considerably improving the performance of
this operation.
In any case, this precaution is only needed in case the
drivers are malicious; and random checks on their loca-
tions can be implemented instead if the drivers are just
covertly active (i.e., they refrain from cheating if there is
a negligible chance of being caught in the act).
7.2 Covertly Active SP
As mentioned in Section 5.4, any valid rider can generate
an ephemeral key to make a ride request. As the SP is-
sues credentials for riders and drivers, it can impersonate
a rider or a driver in its own system.
If the SP continuously impersonates a rider, it could
learn the drivers’ locations from which it could learn the
coarse-grained pick-up locations of the riders. In other
words, if a rider chooses the driver who is the closest to
her pick-up location, the SP would know that she is in
the Voronoi cell of her selected driver. Next, we present
a mechanism for deterring this attack. We note that the
attack is not trivial, due to the high dynamics of the sys-
tem, i.e., drivers can arbitrarily go on-line and off-line
anytime. The SP would not have strong incentives to
perform this attack, because it would add computational
and bandwidth overhead to the service, thus negatively
affecting the productivity of the service itself. To de-
ter this attack, we introduce the notion of Proof-of-Ride
(PoR), defined and used as explained below. An illustra-
tion of the protocol with PoR is shown in Appendix A.1.
Identities Pick-up 
loc. 
Pick-up 
time 
Drop-
off loc. 
Drop-off 
time 
Loc. 
trace 
Fare 
Current 
RHSs 
Rider, 
Driver 
Precise Precise Precise Precise Full Yes 
PrivateRide Driver Zone Obfuscated Zone Obfuscated Partial Yes 
ORide N/A Zone Obfuscated N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 2: Information observed by the SP during ride set-up
procedure w.r.t. different RHS designs. Note that the zone in
ORide is larger than the zone in PrivateRide without affect-
ing the ride-matching optimality (see Section 9.4). Also note
that, the payment operation in ORide reveals some information
about the riders, but it cannot be used to break the anonymity
of the rides (see Section 8).
A PoR is a random number rand generated by the
rider, signed by the driver by using the secret key associ-
ated with her certD, and then blindly signed by the SP by
using blind-signature schemes such as [12], i.e., PoR =
BsigSP{sigD{rand}}. It is used to prove to the drivers
that the rider is real, i.e., she did a ride in the past. When
a rider makes a ride request, she has to provide in her
ride request a PoR, the certD and the random number
rand used in the PoR. A PoR can be used only once. For
the first ride, PoR= certR.
To prevent the SP from creating its own certR and
certD in order to create its own fake PoR, the SP has to
provide a public bulletin board such as certificate trans-
parency [26]: the SP maintains and publishes a publicly
auditable and append-only log of all rider and driver cer-
tificates it has issued and revoked. Whenever a driver
receives a PoR, she can check whether the rider’s certifi-
cate certR (in the case of the first ride), or the driver’s
certificate indicated in the PoR, is in the list of certifi-
cates published by the SP. In this way, if the SP inter-
nally creates fake accounts, it can be detected by audit-
ing authorities, similarly to the cases of companies open-
ing fake user accounts [9]. Similarly, to prevent a rider
from double-spending a PoR, and the SP from reusing a
valid PoR to perform the aforementioned active attack,
the SP maintains and publishes an append-only logs of
PoRs that have been spent, or cancelled (due to ride can-
cellation).
Note that PoR could create a point of linkability,
i.e., the SP is able to know that the rider is in the set
of identities indicated in the fare reports deposited by a
specific driver. This can be easily prevented by using
anonymous-reputation and anonymous-payment systems
(e.g., e-cash), as used in the PrivateRide system [37].
8 Privacy and Security Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis of ORide to show
that it effectively addresses against the privacy attacks
described in Section 3.1.
The SP cannot de-anonymize a rider or driver through
their anonymous logins by using their ACs. This is guar-
anteed due to the anonymity and unlinkability properties
of the ACL anonymous credential system [8]. Addition-
ally, the SP cannot obtain extra information from the rid-
ers’ and drivers’ encrypted locations and their encrypted
distances; this is due to the semantic security property of
the FV encryption scheme [15].
In ORide, the information observed by the SP from
ORide operations can be put in two databases, as follows
(see Table 2).
• Ride DB, in which each entry contains the role and ex-
piration date of the AC, the pick-up zone and obfus-
cated pick-up time. The role and expiration date are
coarse-grained, i.e., all ACs issued on the same day ex-
pire at the end of the day they were issued.
• Payment DB, in which each entry contains a rider’s ID,
a driver’s ID, a fare, and the day the fare report is de-
posited to the SP. Note that this database does not exist
if payment is done through e-cash or regular cash, as the
fare and payment are done without the SP knowledge.
(A2) Large-scale inference attacks by the SP. To pro-
file riders’ and drivers’ activities, the SP needs to learn
the identities, the locations, and the times associated with
their rides.
By using the Payment DB, the SP would know which
specific rider took a ride with a specific driver on which
day and what its fare was. Since RHS drivers are of-
ten licensed to operate in a city or state, knowing that
a rider took a ride with a specific driver, the SP might
be able to know the city where the rider took a ride, but
it does not know the specific location in the city. Note
that, in most cases, as the city could be inferred from
the zones reported by the riders in their ride requests,
this is not an additional leakage of information. In ad-
dition, knowing the home/work addresses and the fares
of the rides, the SP might be able to infer if a rider went
from home to work. However, note that even for frequent
rides between home and work of the same rider, the fares
would not be the same due to different routes and traf-
fic conditions. Therefore, the inference of rides between
home and work of a rider is error-prone. Moreover,
such rides are not sensitive, compared to others, such as
one-night stands, going to abortion clinics or political-
party meetings. For improved anonymity, anonymous-
payment methods, such as e-cash or regular cash, could
be used to decouple the riders’ identities from the fares,
thus preventing the SP from learning about rides between
home and work of the riders.
By using the Ride DB, the SP might be able to guess
the identities of the riders, only if the pick-up zone has a
limited number of ride activities and riders, e.g., a zone
where only one rider lives. This case, however, is un-
likely to happen in ORide, because the zones are defined
in such a way that each zone has at least a large mini-
mum number of ride requests per day, while balancing
the bandwidth requirements for the drivers. We illustrate
this in Section 9. Note that the SP would be detected if
it lied about the activity densities in the zones, because
these densities are public knowledge [41], and the drivers
would notice if they received very few ride requests from
a certain zone.
In the case where the SP knows that a rider makes ride
requests from a specific zone (e.g., the zone that contains
her home/work addresses) and it wants to know the pick-
up times of these rides, the anonymity set of a ride is
the number of rides that occurred on the same day from
that zone. As this requires the SP to have precise knowl-
edge about the pick-up zones, the anonymity-set size in
this case is the lower-bound estimation of the anonymity
set for the general case of large-scale profiling attacks
by the SP. This lower bound is used in the evaluation of
the anonymity set achieved by ORide, presented in Sec-
tion 9.
(A3) Targeted attacks by the SP. In the case where
the SP knows the precise pick-up location and time of a
ride, it still cannot know the drop-off location and time
of the ride, because, in ORide, the drop-off event is not
reported to the SP. Knowing the fare from the Payment
DB, the SP might be able to guess whether the target
went home or to work, but it could not know about other
destinations. However, note that similar to the aforemen-
tioned case, the inference of rides between home and
work of a rider is error-prone. Also such rides are not
very sensitive. Anonymous-payment methods, such as
e-cash could be used to prevent these attacks.
PII- and location-harvesting attacks by out-
siders. ORide relies on a similar proximity-check
mechanism as PrivateRide, hence it provides the same
guarantees for harvesting-attacks against drivers’ PII.
However, a malicious outsider might attempt to triangu-
late drivers, to obtain a snapshot of the locations of all
drivers in a zone: It could make three fake ride requests
from different locations at the same time to obtain
the distances, and cancels these requests immediately.
ORide mitigates this attack by applying two measures:
(1) requiring a deposit token from each rider per request,
thus making the attack more financially expensive and
enabling the SP to identify riders who make many
requests and cancel (as discussed in Section 5.6), and
(2) permuting the list of drivers’ indices for each ride
request (Step 2 in Section 5.4). Also, the SP can define
a smaller threshold on the number of ACs each rider
account can obtain per day, if the threat of such an attack
is high.
9 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our protocols by using a real
taxi-trace data-set. We first evaluate the performance of
the ride-matching operation in terms of computational
and bandwidth requirements for the riders and drivers.
We then evaluate the effect of Euclidean distances on the
optimality of ride-matching operations.
9.1 Data-Sets
Our data-set consists of over 1.1 billion taxi rides in New
York from January 2009 to June 2015 [42]. We ex-
tracted data for the month of October in 2013, one of
the busiest months in the data-set, which resulted in a
subset of over 15 million rides. In this subset, the aver-
age duration of the rides is 13 minutes. The GPS traces
of the rides are not given; however, the precise pick-
up and drop-off locations and times, and pseudo-IDs of
the taxi drivers associated with the rides are provided.
In addition, the data-set provides mapping between lati-
tude/longitude coordinates to NYC census tracts (CTs),
neighborhood tabulation areas (NTAs) and boroughs in
NYC.
We make the following assumptions. First, the drop-
off location of a driver is her waiting location for new
ride requests. Second, a ride-request event is a pick-up
event (i.e., consisting of a pick-up location and pick-up
time) in our data-set. Third, for each ride-request event,
the set of drivers available for that request consists of
drivers who have at least one drop-off event in the last 30
minutes since the ride-request timestamp. The 30-minute
interval is chosen, because the data-set shows that 99th
percentile of the time gap between the drop-off event of
a driver and her next pick-up event is approximately 30
minutes.
9.2 Implementation Details
Our ORide prototype features the main cryptographic op-
erations for the ride matching in the ride set-up procedure
(Section 5.4). Other cryptographic operations needed for
requesting a ride, i.e., AC operations and blind signa-
tures, and for setting up the proximity channel between
the rider’s app and the driver’s app, can be found in the
evaluation of the PrivateRide system [37].
To measure the cryptographic overhead of ride-
matching operations, we implemented a proof-of-
concept ORide in C++, by relying on the NFLlib li-
brary [29]. In our experiments, the SP, the rider, and the
driver are located on the same computer, hence network
delays are not considered. However, the network de-
lay would not impose a considerable overhead, because
a ride-matching operation requires only one round-trip
message between the rider and the SP, and one round-
trip message between the SP and each driver. Also, the
amount of data exchanged between the rider and the SP,
Setting Rider Driver
Algorithm Upload(KB)
Download
(KB)
Download
(KB)
Upload
(KB)
S1 372 761856 124 248
S2 372 186 124 248
S3 372 186 124 248
Table 3: Per-ride bandwidth requirements of ORide, with
d = 4096, log2(q) = 124, and there are 4096 drivers
available for a ride request (n = 4096). Compared to the
naive SHE approach S1, optimized approaches (S2 and
S3) significantly reduce the bandwidth requirements for
the riders
and the SP and the drivers, is small (as discussed in Sec-
tion 9.4). Note that, similarly to current RHSs, the SP
can implement a timeout for responses from the drivers
such that the latency is reasonable for the service. Due
to the dependency requirements of the NFLlib, it is not
trivial to port the implementation to mobile platforms.
However, to make our experiments close to the perfor-
mance of smartphones, in all of our evaluations, we did
not use SSE or AVX optimizations for Intel processors.
The ORide proof-of-concept implementation on smart-
phones is work in progress.
9.3 Per-Ride Overhead
In this section, we describe our experimental setup, and
presents the bandwidth and computational overhead per
ride request for a rider and a driver.
We used ORide’s prototype to estimate the overhead
added for ride-matching operations in three settings: (S1)
when naive SHE approach (Section 4.2) without using
re-linearizations at the SP is used, (S2) when ciphertext-
packing optimizations are used and the drivers correctly
write their coordinates to their assigned allocated slots
(Section 5.4), and (S3) when ciphertext-packing op-
timizations are used and protection against malicious
drivers (Section 7.1) is needed.
Experimental Setup. To measure the performance of
our system, we used a computer (Intel i5-4200U CPU,
2.6 GHz, 6 GB RAM) with Debian Jessie (Linux ker-
nel 3.16). The security parameters used in our experi-
ments are tuned to achieve an equivalent bit-security of
more than 112 bits, therefore exceeding current NIST
standards for 2016-2030 [4]. With this security target,
and a plaintext size of 20 bits the needed polynomial di-
mension is d = 4096, with coefficients of size 124 bits
(each polynomial has a size of 62 KB). These parame-
ters guarantee both 112-bits of security and correct ho-
momorphic operations for homomorphically adding up
to 4096 encrypted locations in the same ciphertext and
calculating the corresponding Euclidean distances.2 We
2We refer the reader to Section 6 in [15] for more details on the
choice of cryptographic parameters for FV. It is worth noting that we
Setting Rider Driver SP
Algorithm
Gen. keys
(ms)
Encrypt
(ms)
Decrypt
(ms)
Load key
(ms)
Encrypt
(ms)
Load key
(ms)
Compute Dist.
(ms)
S1 1.51±0.06 2.6±0.2 7823.4±573.4 0.53±0.01 2.6±0.2 0.53±0.01 113868.8±6553
S2 1.51±0.06 2.6±0.2 2.2±0.1 0.53±0.01 2.6±0.2 0.53±0.01 208.9±4
S3 1.51±0.06 2.6±0.2 2.2±0.1 0.53±0.01 2.6±0.2 0.53±0.01 745.5±24.5
Table 4: Per-ride computational overhead of ORide (without AVX/SSE optimizations), for d = 4096, log2(q) = 124,
and there are 4096 drivers available for a request. Statistics (avg ± std.dev.) were computed from 1000 experiments.
Compared to the naive SHE approach (S1), optimized approaches (S2 and S3) significantly reduces the computation
time for the SP and the decryption time for the riders.
refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for more details about
the possible granularity a geographical area can have.
Assuming that a rider makes a ride request to the SP
and that there are 4096 drivers available for the request
(n= 4096), with the aforementioned security parameters,
the bandwidth requirements and computational overhead
per ride request, for a rider and a driver, are shown in
Table 3 and Table 4, and explained below.
• Bandwidth overhead for a rider: In all three settings,
for each ride request, a rider sends to the SP a public
key and two ciphertexts for her encrypted planar coor-
dinates. This totals 6 polynomials, a payload size of
372 KB.
Regarding the number of distance ciphertexts a rider
receives from the SP, in setting S1, it is equal to n,
i.e., the number of responding drivers. In settings S2
and S3, it is significantly reduced to dn/de, due to ci-
phertext packing. A ciphertext distance, when avoiding
relinearizations (see Section 5.4), consists of 3 poly-
nomials, thus having a total size of 186 KB. Assum-
ing 4096 drivers respond to a ride request, setting S1
would require the SP to send 4096 distance ciphertexts
(744 MB) to the rider, whereas S2 would require only
one distance ciphertext (186 KB).
• Bandwidth overhead for a driver: In all three settings,
for each request: (1) on the downlink, the SP for-
wards to each driver a public key, 2 polynomials of size
124 KB, and (2) on the uplink, each driver sends back
to the SP her encrypted planar coordinates, totaling 4
polynomials of size 248 KB.
• Computational overhead: As shown in Table 4, for
both riders and drivers, in all three settings, the com-
putational overhead introduced by key generation and
encryption operations are small, i.e., 1.5 ms and 2.6 ms,
respectively. Due to masking, setting S3 introduces
a small computational overhead for the SP in ho-
momorphic squared-Euclidean-distance computation,
have considered pessimistic bounds in order to cope with recently pub-
lished attacks that reevaluate the security of lattice-based cryptosys-
tems [6].
compared to setting S2 (745 ms vs. 208.9 ms). How-
ever, noticeably, due to ciphertext packing, settings S2
and S3 significantly reduce the computational cost for
the SP (208.9 and 745 ms compared to 113868.8 ms
required by S1). It also significantly reduces the de-
cryption overhead for the rider, from 7823 ms in setting
S1 to 2.2 ms in settings S2 and S3.
Note that the results for the rider and driver are opti-
mistic, as we used a laptop instead of a smartphone
(however, as stated before, CPU optimizations were not
used to reduce the difference). While such comparisons
are not straightforward, we can do a rough estimation
of the expected performance of ORide in smartphones.
For instance, comparing the performance scores of top
multicore CPUs in smartphones [2] with top multicore
CPUs in desktops [3], we can see that the difference is
less than an order of magnitude. Assuming such differ-
ence, then we can see that the computational overheads
for key generation, encryption and decryption are still
acceptable in smartphones, around 15 ms, 26 ms, and
22 ms, respectively. The overhead is still acceptable
even if we consider two orders of magnitude difference,
as the total time to hail a ride is in the order of min-
utes [18].
9.4 Riders’ Anonymity and Drivers’ Band-
width Requirements
In this section, we present the trade-off between the ride-
anonymity set vs. bandwidth requirements for the riders
and drivers, by using the real data-set presented in Sec-
tion 9.1.
Due to the high demand of taxi rides in Manhattan
w.r.t. lower activity in other boroughs in NYC (from our
data-set, Manhattan accounts for 90% of ride requests),
we define two zone settings as follows.
• Setting one (Z1): Manhattan is divided into census
tracts (CTs). Each CT is one zone. The boroughs of
Queens and Bronx are merged into one zone, and the
boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island are merged into
one zone.
• Setting two (Z2): Manhattan is divided into neighbor-
hood tabulation areas (NTAs). Each NTA is one zone.
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Figure 3: System performance. (a) Anonymity-set size, (b) Upload speed requirement for the drivers, (c) Monthly-data
plan requirement for the drivers. It shows that ORide is scalable while providing good anonymity-set for riders.
Similarly to setting one, the boroughs of Queens and
Bronx are merged into one zone, and the boroughs of
Brooklyn and Staten Island are merged into one zone.
Estimation of the anonymity set. As explained in Sec-
tion 8, the number of rides in a day from a zone is a
lower-bound estimation of the anonymity set for a ride.
Fig. 3a shows the experimental cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the lower-bound anonymity-set size.
It can be observed that, for Manhattan with the zone
granularity of census tracts, 81.7% of the rides have an
anonymity set of size at least 50, and for a zone con-
sisting of Queens and Bronx, all of the rides have an
anonymity-set size of at least approximately 26,000.
Bandwidth requirements for riders. The bandwidth
requirements for a rider, per ride request, depends on
the number of available drivers. Our experiments show
that for both zone settings, for all ride requests, the num-
ber of available drivers is less than 3,500. This means
that with the security parameter chosen (as presented in
Section 9.3) and when proposed optimized packing ap-
proaches are used, a rider needs to download only one
ciphertext distance, i.e., 186 KB, which is negligible.
Bandwidth requirements for drivers. Fig. 3b shows
the CDF of the upload speed required for the drivers; the
upload speed is computed by multiplying the number of
requests a driver receives per second with the size of the
ciphertexts she has to upload per request. Note that the
required downlink speed is half of the uplink speed, be-
cause the downlink payload is half the size of the up-
link payload (Section 9.3). It shows that for Manhattan
with the zone granularity of census tracts, the required
upload speed is less than 0.5 Mbps, and for other zones,
the required upload speed is less than 2 Mbps, which is
provided by 3G or 3.5G networks.
Monthly-data plan required for the drivers. Fig. 3c
shows the CDF of a data plan required for the drivers for
two aforementioned zone settings; this is calculated by
multiplying the total number of requests a driver would
receive during her waiting time with the uplink- and
downlink-payloads per request. The result shows that
with the zone setting Z1, a driver needs at most 10 GB
of data per month, and with the zone setting Z2, 60% of
drivers need less than 25 GB of data per month. This re-
quirement is reasonable: For example, in the U. S. , an
unlimited data plan typically offers 20-26 GB of high-
speed data for less than $100 [31]. In addition, the drivers
can reduce their data-plan consumption by using free
WiFi networks, such as LinkNYC [27]. Also, note that
the results presented also show that ORide can scale, be-
cause current RHSs (e.g., Uber) accounts for only 15%
of the ride pick-up requests in NYC [41].
The requirements on bandwidth for the drivers and
the anonymity-set sizes for riders enables the SP to de-
fine the zones that balance the trade-off between the two
aforementioned requirements. For example, for areas
that have a high density of ride activities such as Man-
hattan, the SP could discretize the borough into zones
of CTs or NTAs, or combinations of CTs and NTAs.
Note that, as shown earlier, at the granularity level of
CTs (Z1), the anonymity set provided by ORide for the
case of a very strong adversarial SP is already large. In
special cases, such as concerts and sport events, the SP
can split a crowded zone into sub-zones, in order to find
a balance for the aforementioned trade-off. For areas
that have fewer ride activities, such as other boroughs
in NYC or other cities, an entire borough or city can be
a zone. For example, a zone consisting of the boroughs
of Queens and Bronx would guarantee an anonymity set
of at least 26,000 for a ride, while requiring the drivers
to have an Internet connection of only at most 2 Mbps.
9.5 Effect on Ride Matching
To minimize the extra costs for both the drivers (e.g., gas
and driving time to pickup) and the riders (e.g., waiting
times at pick-up locations), ideally, the ride-matching al-
gorithm should take into account the road networks and
real-time traffic conditions. Due to the limited opera-
tions supported by SHE, ORide uses a simpler matching
metric, i.e., Euclidean distances between the riders’ and
drivers’ locations. In addition, due to the bandwidth con-
straints, the ORide ride-matching algorithm matches a
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Figure 4: Effect of Euclidean distance on the extra dis-
tances for the drivers (left) and on the waiting time for
the riders (right) w.r.t. different zone settings. It shows
that the overhead is reasonable.
rider to drivers in the same zone, hence suboptimality,
e.g., if a rider is close to the border of a zone, the closest
driver might be in one of the neighboring zones.
Fig. 4 shows the CDFs of the relative extra costs due
to the suboptimality of ORide, compared to the ideal so-
lution, w.r.t. thee different zone settings: Z1, Z2, and
the entire city of New York (NYC). The experiment
was done on a set of 1,000 randomly selected ride re-
quests. For the ideal matching, we used the Google
Maps Distance Matrix APIs [23] to compute the times
and distances between a pick-up request and the avail-
able drivers (see assumptions in Section 9.1). To reduce
the number of requests made to the Google APIs3, from
the set of available drivers, we selected 100 drivers who
were closest to the pick-up location as the potential can-
didates for the ideal matching.
It can be observed that the median extra costs are
small: when Z1 is used, in more than 45% of the cases,
the driver selected by ORide and the ideal solution is the
same, and, in nearly 80% of the cases, the extra driv-
ing distance is less than 0.5 km. In addition, the size of
the zone has only negligible effects on the optimality of
the matching algorithm: If the set of all the drivers avail-
able in NYC was used for the ORide matching algorithm,
compared to the ideal solution, 78.7% of the cases would
have an extra distance of less than 0.5 km, compared to
76.2 % and 76.8 % of the cases when Z1 and Z2 were
used, respectively.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed ORide, a practical so-
lution that efficiently matches riders and drivers in a
privacy-preserving way while still offering key RHS fea-
tures such as easy payment, reputation scores, account-
ability, and retrieval of lost items. ORide enables the
SP to choose a balanced trade-off between anonymity
sets for riders vs. bandwidth requirements for the drivers.
For example, for a lower-bound anonymity-set size of
3The number of requests per day is limited.
26,000 for rides from the boroughs of Queens and Bronx,
drivers only need to have an Internet connection of at
most 2 Mbps. The trade-off enables the SP to define the
zones such that all users in the system are guaranteed
large anonymity sets, even if they are in sparsely popu-
lated residential areas with sparse ride activities (by ex-
panding the zones). We have also shown that, even in the
extreme case of targeted attacks, i.e., a curious SP wants
to know the destination of a rider given the time and lo-
cation of a rider’s pick-up event, the location privacy of
the rider’s destination is still guaranteed.
For part of our future work, we plan to implement
a full prototype of the system on mobile platforms and
to design more advanced distance estimation algorithms,
instead of the Euclidean distance.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Chris Soghoian for his sug-
gestions about accountability and usability of RHSs in
the beginning of the work. The authors also would like
to thank Christian Mouchet for his thorough review of
the final paper.
References
[1] http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/14/8778111/uber-
threatens-to-fire-drivers-attending-protests-in-
china. Last visited: Jan. 2017.
[2] http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-
benchmarks. Last visited: Jan. 2017.
[3] http://browser.primatelabs.com/processor-
benchmarks. Last visited: Jan. 2017.
[4] Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General, SP 800-
57 Part 1 Rev. 4. Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/
NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4, January 2016. Last visited: Feb. 2017.
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A Appendix
A.1 Covertly Active SP
Fig. 5 illustrates the changes introduced to the original
ride set-up procedure (Section 5.4) to handle a covertly
active SP. In this protocol, we introduce the notion of
Proof-of-Ride (PoR), a token that is used to prove to the
drivers that the rider is real, i.e., she did a ride in the past.
Rider: anonymous session sR SP Driver: anonymous session sD
[Steps (3) to (10) are the same as in Fig. 2]
(1) z, dt, r′dt , cxR , cyR , k p, PoR (2) k p, PoR
(10) Fare report
(10a) rand
(10b) BsigSP{sigD{rand}}
(10c) PoR = sigSP{sigD{rand}}
Figure 5: Changes introduced to the original ride set-up protocols (Fig. 2) to handle covertly active SP.
A.2 Plaintext Space
Assume a geographical area of size s× s and a plaintext
space of b bits to represent the squared-Euclidean dis-
tances between points in the area. The area can be quan-
tized into a grid with cells of size s/2(b−1)/2×s/2(b−1)/2,
with the explanation as follows. Assuming the area is
discretized into a grid of v× v cells, the largest possible
squared-Euclidean distance between any two points on
the grid is 2× v2, and this has to be at most 2b. There-
fore, v≤ 2(b−1)/2. In other words, each edge of size s can
be discretized into v points, and the distance between any
pair of two consecutive points is s/2(b−1)/2. Therefore,
the area can be represented by a grid with cells of size
s/2(b−1)/2× s/2(b−1)/2.
For example, with 20-bit plaintext space, a geographi-
cal area of size 60 km2, such as the borough of Manhat-
tan in NYC, would be quantized into a grid of resolution
approximately 10 m × 10 m.
A.3 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we briefly describe the cryptographic
building blocks used in ORide.
Blind signatures. A blind-signature scheme [12] is
a form of digital-signature schemes in which the signer
does not know the content of the message that she is sign-
ing. This is achieved by enabling the signature requester
to ‘blind’ (i.e., randomize) the message before sending
it to the signer. When the signature requester receives
the signature on her blinded message, she ‘unblinds’ it
to obtain a valid signature for the original message. The
signer, when is asked to verify the signature of an un-
blinded message, is not able to link this message back to
the blinded version she signed.
Anonymous credentials. An anonymous credential
(AC) is a cryptographic token with which the credential
owner can prove to another party that she satisfies certain
properties without revealing her real identity. In ORide,
a user is identified when she obtains ACs from the SP.
However, when she wants to start an anonymous session,
she reveals to the SP only the expiration date and the role
specified in the AC (i.e., rider or driver), and she proves
to the SP, in a zero-knowledge fashion, that she knows
the private key associated with the AC. To prove her rep-
utation to a driver, a rider reveals to the driver the repu-
tation score specified in her AC together with the proof
to show that the revealed value is trustworthy. ORide re-
lies on the Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL). How-
ever, note that ACL is a linkable anonymous credential
scheme, i.e., a user can only use a credential once to
avoid her transactions from being linkable.
Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT). An NTT is
the finite ring version of a Discrete Fourier Transform; an
n-point NTT of a vector x ∈ Znt and its inverse operation
NTT−1 have the form
X = [NTT(x)k]
n−1
k=0 =
[
n−1
∑
i=1
xiαki
]n−1
k=0
,
x =
[
NTT−1(X )k
]n−1
k=0 =
[
n−1
n−1
∑
k=1
Xkα−ki
]n−1
i=0
,
where n−1 is the modulo inverse of n in Zt , and α is
a principal n-th root of unity in Zt , whose existence is
a necessary condition for the transform. The NTT can
be implemented with fast algorithms with complexity
O(n logn), especially when n is a power of 2. The NTT
presents a convolution property, that relates the circular
convolution (~) of two vectors with the component-wise
product (·) of their transformed versions, such that
x~ y = NTT−1(NTT(x) ·NTT(y)).
Therefore, an O(n2) operation like the convolu-
tion gets reduced to the complexity of the transforms
(O(n logn)) and the component-wise product (O(n)). For
the used cryptographic application, the product operation
in the polynomial ring is a nega-cyclic convolution in-
stead of a cyclic one; this slightly changes its formula-
tion, and it imposes the requirement of a 2n-th root of
unity in Zt (we refer the reader to [36] for further de-
tails).
